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ABSTRACT 
A number of attempts were made during the 20th century to develop national freight flow 
information for South Africa. This paper discusses these contributions and attempts to 
identify the major reasons why the research did not give rise to long-term strategic 
infrastructure planning. It is important to learn these lessons to avoid making the same 
mistakes during the critical large-scale infrastructure investments that are unfolding in the 
first half of the 21st century.  The paper starts with an overview of the development of 
South Africa’s surface freight transport infrastructure, and then provides a cross-country 
comparison of South Africa’s key freight indicators. This serves to underscore the 
importance of a long-term approach to such infrastructure investment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The freight transport infrastructure challenges that South Africa faces at the start of the 21st 
century – including an investment backlog and limited road-rail collaboration – can be 
traced back to myopic decisions that were made in the past century (Havenga, Pienaar, and 
Simpson, 2011). Those decisions were the consequence of the historical absence of a long-
term, strategic view of infrastructure planning exacerbated by politically-motivated 
agendas. 
 
In 1928, and before formal road transport regulation, Frankel (1928, 113) reported: 
Instead of the decisions on new railway construction being left to an expert body acting on 
commercial principles and co-ordinating the expenditure on it with the capital expenditure 
necessary in other directions, not only is the amount to be spent every year decided mainly 
by the Minister of Railways and Harbours and the Government, but it appears that even the 
decision as to which of the proposed lines of railway are to be constructed depends largely 
on the wishes of the Minister. 
 
Decision-making was hampered by the lack of appropriate information on total surface 
freight transport flows. According to Smith (1973, 4): 
As long ago as 1957, the Minister of Transport indicated that he had given instructions to 
the National Transport Commission to conduct a survey of all road traffic. As far as can be 




In an analysis of the South African transport sector in the 1970s, Jones (1999, 186) 
confirmed that a “detailed picture of modal shares in land transport has been notoriously 
difficult to construct in South Africa, principally because of the paucity of robust road 
transport data”. 
 
These challenges led to “a significant lack of co-ordination between the provision of road 
and rail infrastructure” during the 20th century (Mitchell 2004). Gathering and applying 
relevant market intelligence is the first crucial step in coordinating a strategic planning 
process (Havenga and Hobbs 2004). Stigson (2004, 1) also highlights the need to “measur[e] 
the gap between where we are, and where we want to be” as a core requirement for 
implementing the World Business Council for Sustainable Development's strategies for 
freight transport. 
 
There were a however a few notable attempts during the 20th century to develop national 
freight flow information for South Africa. This paper discusses these contributions and 
attempts to identify the major reasons why the research did not give rise to long-term 
strategic infrastructure planning so as to avoid these pitfalls during the critical large-scale 
infrastructure investments that are unfolding in the first half of the 21st century. 
At the outset, an overview of the development of South Africa's surface freight transport 
infrastructure is provided, culminating in a cross-country comparison of South Africa's key 
freight indicators. This serves to underscore the importance of a long-term approach to such 
infrastructure investment. 
 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S SURFACE FREIGHT TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
DURING THE 20th CENTURY 
The development of South Africa's road and rail transport infrastructure started in earnest 
when the diamond and gold rush in the latter part of the 19th century was followed by a 
railway development rush to transport people and goods to and from the new hinterland 
economic hubs. The political agendas of the then two British colonies (Cape and Natal) and 
two independent Boer republics (Transvaal and the Orange Free State) significantly 
influenced development and led to destructive tariff wars amongst the colonial and republic 
railway administrations. The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 led to these 
lines being officially connected and the establishment of one national railway organisation. 
This organisation controlled more than 12,000 route kilometres (60% of today's total). This 
grew to approximately 22,000 kilometres by the late 1920s. The railway network reached its 
peak in terms of route length at this stage (Solomon 1983; Jones 2002; Mitchell 2004). 
In South Africa the road versus rail debate intensified towards the end of the 1920s as rail 
was losing customers to the rapidly developing road transport industry.  
 
One of the key reasons for this was the differential tariffing system applied by rail to support 
the government's economic objectives: low tariffs for mining and agriculture, and high 
tariffs for industrial goods. This was the first form of cross-subsidisation and the first threat 
to rail density as higher-value goods sought to move to road transport, because of the 
inordinately high tariffs charged for rail transportation. The modal shift reduced rail density 
and applied cost pressures on lower-value commodities (Havenga 2007). 
 
This led to the controversial Motor Carrier Transportation Act of 1930 which restricted the 
operational freedom of all road freight, except that used by farmers, local authorities and 
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government departments. Permits for transporting isolated categories such as perishable 
goods could be obtained by road transporters, but the Act, enforced by railway police 
inspectors, ensured that most land-freight was rail-based. Despite this there was an upsurge 
in road haulage in the decade following World War Two to support South Africa's fast-
growing economy. Repeated exemptions as well as some relaxation of the regulations led to 
road haulage replacing rail as the dominant form of freight from the mid-1970s (Mitchell 
2006, 1). 
 
The National Transport Policy Study (NTPS) of 1986, which focused on the strategic 
importance of transport to the economic and social development of the country, identified 
the need for deregulation and privatisation of transport as a whole. This led to deregulation 
of the transport industry in 1989 with the scrapping of the road permit system and the focus 
shifting to the regulation of safety through the Road Freight Quality System (RFQS) (Mitchell 
2006, 1), followed in 1989 by the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services 
Act when the South African Transport Services was transformed into a public company, 
Transnet Limited (Van Niekerk 2004). The RFQS was however never implemented and 
critical investment and maintenance by Transnet was delayed due to its sole shareholder's 
focus on establishing a democracy in South Africa. 
 
Deregulation was followed by, for the most part, well-researched and visionary policies and 
strategies by the national Department of Transport (DoT). In 1996 the White Paper on 
National Transport Policy (NTP), the first transport policy following the country's transition 
to democracy in 1994, reaffirmed and built on the principles of NTPS.  
 
In 1998, the DoT commissioned the Moving South Africa project (MSA) to translate the 1996 
NTP into a long-term strategy to realise the White Paper vision of an integrated land freight 
transport system that would meet the country's economic and social ideals (DoT 1996, 
1998). In 2005, the DoT released the National Freight Logistics Strategy (NFLS), building on 
the NTP and MSA (DoT 2005) focusing on institutional restructuring and economic 
regulation with the transport industry. There has, however, been limited implementation of 
these policies and strategies, due mostly to the fact that South Africa's logistics 
infrastructure planning is fragmented. Various agencies (such as SANRAL), state-owned 
enterprises (such as Transnet) and government departments (such as the Department of 
Transport and the Department of Public Enterprises) owns and/or manages different 
portions of the country's logistics infrastructure. This inevitably leads to a lack of an 
integrated vision (Havenga 2011). 
 
This history is mirrored in the growth trends in road and rail freight transport infrastructure 
in comparison to GDP growth from 1910 until 2005 (Figure 1). 
The rail route distance has stagnated since the 1930s (with the exception of building the 
coal and iron ore export lines in the 1970s). Between 1950 and 1980, paved roads and road 
and rail rolling stock and motive power increased exponentially to keep pace with the 
demands of the growing economy and growing international trade. Leading up to and 
following deregulation of the freight transport industry, the corporatisation of Transnet and 
political priorities shifting to the “new South Africa”, investment in rail rolling stock declined 
significantly and this decline has only recently been halted. 
The result of the uncoordinated developments is that South Africa's transport productivity is 
low and its cost of logistics high in international terms. Transport productivity is measured 
as GDP per ton-kilometre. Total global ton-kilometre data is not available, but extensive 
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desktop research uncovered measurements for 40 countries adding to a total of 13 905 
billion ton-kilometre. The total GDP for these countries is $47 trillion (of the world total of 
approximately $60 trillion, i.e. almost 80% of global GDP, therefore a representative 
comparison), with an average transport productivity of $3.40 of GDP per ton-kilometre 
delivered. South Africa's result was $1.15 of GDP per ton-kilometre delivered with only four 
of the 40 countries being in a worse position. 
 Australia (National Road) 
 Canada (International Rail, National Road) 
 Japan (National Rail, National Road) 
 Mexico (International Rail, National Road) 
 New Zealand (International Rail, National Road) 
 Portugal (National Road) 
 Ukraine (International Rail, National Road) 
 Wikipedia (2010): Ukraine (Total Rail) 
 Bambulyak and Frantzen (2007): Russia (Internation Rail) 
 USA DoT (2007): USA data 
GDP data was obtained from two sources: USA DoT (2009) and Trading Economics (2008). 
Logistics costs comparisons were obtained from 
http://www.nssga.org/government/Reauthorization/14_Section_C.pdf. 
 
Low transport productivity can be caused by many factors, but is mostly a result of poor 
spatial planning and/or spatial distribution of the economy. Small countries with relatively 
high GDPs will do well (such as Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom) and sprawling countries with efficient spatial distribution (often with most of the 
dense production centres at the coast) will also do reasonably well (Norway, Australia and 
Canada). When transport distances however become inordinately long with many 
production centres away from the coast, the demand for transport generally increases 
disproportionately to economic productivity.  
 
This impacts the cost of logistics negatively and confirms the importance of both supply- and 
demand-side management.  Available comparisons between South Africa's logistics costs as 
percentage of GDP and those of other countries are depicted in Figure 3. (These 
comparisons are illustrative due to the fact that different methodologies are used within 
each country, and the methodologies are not publicly available). It does seem, however, 
that South Africa's logistics cost is high in international terms.  The impact of transport 
infrastructure investment on economic growth is elucidated in the next section and renders 
the importance of long-term planning self-evident. 
 
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING AND 
ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Long-term planning is therefore essential as an instrument to facilitate and improve short- 
to medium-term planning and investment decisions, avoiding ad-hoc crisis-driven responses 
(Singer 1991; FAO 1997; ACIL Tasman 2007). Given the political accountability for national 
infrastructure spend – leading both to budget determination by politicians concerned about 
how voters would react to increased spending and by organised interest groups influencing 
spending for the benefit of their members – more focus is however often given to 
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addressing short term issues (that will impact on political ideals) than on long-term planning 
(Hilder 2003). 
 
Politicians’ constituents will try and influence logistics infrastructure spending in a direction 
that will benefit certain groups in the short term, or, alternatively, oppose projects where 
they believe the funds could be better spend. This problem can be solved if the state can 
play a coordinating role and cooperate with emerging entrepreneurial elements in society 
(Schirmer 1998). The state has, in this regard (Delius and Schirmer 2000), a difficult role in 
that it can neither disconnect from the lived experiences of its citizens nor create policy 
based on false presumptions of the future. 
 
The seeming futility of long-term planning (15 years or more) is often reinforced by 
economists due to the uncertainty regarding structural and other changes which may occur 
in the interim period. The results of this state of affairs are “most unfortunate, for it tends 
to lead to economic policy making which is not sufficiently guided by consideration of long-
term strategy”, leading to significant opportunity costs of inappropriate decisions (Singer 
1991, 325). It is imperative to do both – decision-makers have to “articulate the future 
strategy and take action on current implementation issues” (Hilder 2003). 
 
The importance of following a long-term plan for infrastructure provision is underscored by 
the impact of infrastructure spending on economic growth. Research regarding the effect of 
public infrastructure investment (e.g. investment in roads, ports, rail and airports) on 
economic growth is relatively new, with initial studies investigating the connection emerging 
as recently as the late 1980s (Stiff and Smetanin 2010). Aschauer (1989) conducted one of 
the first empirical studies researching this link and provided empirical evidence of the 
positive effect of public infrastructure investment on private investment and private output 
growth, mainly due to improved distribution reducing the cost of trade and access to 
markets. The shift from public investment to public consumption over the 18-year period 
studied (1967–1985) at least partially explains the decline in productivity experienced by the 
G7 industrial economies over the same period (Aschauer 1989, 17). 
 
Démurger's (2001) analysis of the links between infrastructure investment and economic 
growth in China from 1985 to 1998 confirms that geographical location and infrastructure 
endowment accounted significantly for observed differences in growth performance across 
provinces. In a meta-analysis of 76 papers Bom and Ligthart (2008) report the weighted 
average output elasticity of public capital at 0.08 after correcting for publication bias. 
Calderón, Moral-Benito and Servén (2011) conducted a comprehensive study on the 
contribution of infrastructure to aggregate output, covering 88 countries and spanning the 
years 1960–2000, using a multi-dimensional concept of infrastructure, combining power, 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Their results show a highly statistically 
significant long-run elasticity of output with respect to the infrastructure index ranging 
between 0.07 and 0.10. 
 
Turning to investment in transport infrastructure, Lakshmanan and Anderson (2002) report 
that a careful analysis of the empirical studies in this field “has led to broad acceptance of a 
positive and modest economic impact of transport infrastructure” (p. 3). According to Jiang 
(2001), a cost function approach2 shows that public transport infrastructure capital 
contributes to economic growth over time, with elasticities ranging between 0.07 and 0.22. 
In an extensive analysis of 18 OECD countries for the period of 1870–2009, Farhadi (2011) 
demonstrates that an increase in transport investment has an indirect and significant effect 
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on long-run economic growth by raising labour productivity, with transport infrastructure 
contributing 0.09 percentage points to growth during the period. In a detailed historical 
analysis spanning 106 years, Fedderke, Perkins, and Luiz (2006) demonstrate that the impact 
of infrastructure investment on economic growth in South Africa was both strong and 
statistically significant.  
 
Jiang (2001) argues that, given the wide-ranging results of these studies, two sets of policies 
that relates to both current realities and the future vision should simultaneously receive 
attention. As far as current realities are concerned, service quality and its impact on the 
potential utilisation of existing transportation infrastructure plays a role. A successful future 
vision would require transportation infrastructure capital that will promote growth and the 
spatial distribution of economic activities. 
 
Goodwin (2000) however cautions that there are not necessarily automatic large-scale 
economic or employment benefits to be derived from public investment in transport 
infrastructure. The specific local circumstances and the nature of the transport investment 
determine the economic impact. Often, transport infrastructure investments are “ill-
conceived attempts to cater for traffic growth rather than efforts to improve transport” 
(Goodwin 2000: 7). Lakshmanan and Anderson (2002) also argue that the benefits accruing 
from an infrastructure investment is context dependent and that economic assessments 
must incorporate a broader range of interrelationships and data than is typical in current 
practice. 
 
Laaksonen (1999), Yevdokimov (2000) and Brown and Hatch (2002) refer for instance to the 
benefits of intermodal transport as a general purpose technology (GPT) typically 
characterised by statistically significant spillover effects to other areas of the economy. 
According to Yevdokimov (2000) a once-off 10% increase both in the frequency of transport 
and transport network expansion due to intermodal transport resulted in a permanent 
increase in annual economic growth, reaching a peak of 3% per annum after 15 years and 
settling over the long-term at a 0.4% increase in economic growth per annum. 
 
Therefore, investment in context-appropriate transport infrastructure should facilitate 
economic growth. To determine this investment, strategic planning supported by a 
maintained market intelligence database, is critical. In this regard, Singer (1991, 328) 
emphasises the importance of quantifying and forecasting the variables that will impact on 
the long-term framework, despite the pitfalls of forecasting since “informed guesstimates 
are superior to no knowledge whatsoever” (Olgaard and Rasmussen 1969, cited in Singer 
1991, 331). Lakshmanan and Anderson (2002), in turn, accentuate the need for 
performance-based indicators to track performance of the macro-logistics system against 
the long term framework. 
 
In order to build this market intelligence database, Bogetić and Fedderke (2006) and Pienaar 
(2005, 2008, 2010) recommend a deeper analysis of the transport sector to develop a more 
nuanced picture of the different surface freight transport modes. The attempts in South 







4. QUANTIFICATION OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT VOLUMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The main research contributions to the development of freight flows in South Africa during 
the 20th century were those of Verburgh (1958), Smith (1973) and Hamilton (1983, 1986), 
and to a lesser extent (because of little supporting references) those of Van der Veer (1982), 
Kennedy (1984) and Pretorius (1991). 
 
There are essentially three methodologies available for quantifying freight volumes: 
questionnaire-based surveys, truck movement observations and gravity modelling. The first 
underperforms notoriously except in countries with mandatory filing, such as the USA. 
Mandatory filing uses the same methodology as surveys, but participants are forced to 
submit answers.  
 
The second is the most cost-effective option, but provides little commodity visibility. The 
third method has the potential to provide the most comprehensive information, but only if 
it is done in detail and is adequately funded. All of the contributions that will be discussed in 
this paper followed a supply-side survey approach, i.e. distributing questionnaires to road 
freight transport service providers. 
Before discussing these contributions, it is important to define the following concepts: 
 
 Transportable GDP is defined as that portion of GDP that produces a physical 
component requiring transportation from point of origin to point of production or 
consumption, specifically the agricultural, mining and manufacturing subsectors of 
GDP (i.e. the primary and secondary sectors of the economy). 
 
 The absence of a time series for road data necessitates the use of a proxy for rail 
market share to enable the analysis of trends in modal market share. This proxy is 
calculated as rail data as a percentage of transportable GDP (the figures for tons 
transported by rail are available from the national rail operator dating from 1910). 
The comparison is not a precise measurement of market share, but remains a good 
approximation of modal shift in the absence of other data. A decrease in this ratio 
implies a decrease in rail market share and an increase in road market share. 
 
 Surface freight transport is that portion of total freight transport that is transported 
by road and rail. 
 
 Road transport can be subdivided into ancillary road transport, which refers to the 
provision of road transport services by freight owners themselves, and road 
transport for reward, which refers to the outsourcing of the function by freight 
owners to road transport companies. 
 
 A ton-kilometre is the standard unit of measuring freight transport and is the 
product of tons and distance travelled. (Empty running, i.e. what is sometimes is 








4.1 Verburgh's 1958 research 
 
Verburgh (1958) pioneered detailed studies of road transportation volumes in South Africa. 
The primary goal of Verburgh's work was to shed light on the balance between the supply of 
transport infrastructure and the demand for that infrastructure (this goal was not reached). 
Verburgh's survey methods were based on a special study of the Transportation and 
Communications Commission of the United Nations Organisation. This study suggested that 
in most countries the technique of sampling and limited-period questioning provided the 
best method to obtain road transport performance figures.  
 
Verburgh and his team at the Bureau for Economic Research at the University of 
Stellenbosch drew a sample of both ancillary and for-reward road transport service 
providers to develop an understanding of the industry.  Verburgh's work included defining 
capacity in terms of equipment for road and rail and defining the ‘safe’ domains for rail and 
road in two categories.  
 
These are fragile, urgent and perishable for road, and bulk long-haul for rail. In his analysis, 
Verburgh expressed satisfaction with the growth of 78% in tons transported by rail in the 
period 1937–1956, which he attributed to the growth in intercity transport.  A retrospective 
analysis of Verburgh's data, however, highlights disconcerting trends that were not 
commented on.  Verburgh's rail tons as a percentage of transportable GDP (which was 
available in 1958, but not utilised in this fashion) is illustrated in Figure 5 (the rail market 
share proxy defined earlier). 
 
The time series points to several interesting developments and resulting structural 
challenges in transport during the period under review: 
 Rail's share of agricultural traffic increased. This sector was the most heavily 
subsidised, the most difficult to transport (because of the many collection points) 
and one of the most difficult to invest in as far as transport equipment is concerned 
(since the traffic is seasonal and the equipment is therefore not utilised throughout 
the year – hence there are even more fixed costs than incurred by road). It is also 
cyclical, thereby exacerbating all these challenges. In addition, the sector reaches 
equilibrium points, where neither imports nor exports of commodities are necessary, 
directly influencing the share of transport versus production. The issue of 
agricultural market share and the development of branch lines were political ones. 
This did not change until the 1980s as South Africa and Transnet were preparing for 
change. 
 
 Rail's share of mining-sector transport remained static. As most mining commodities 
are transported over long distances from fixed points of extraction to fixed 
production plants or harbours, this is by nature rail's bread-and-butter transport. 
 
 Rail's share of manufacturing-sector transport declined by one-fifth. This could be 
partly attributed to structural changes, such as shifts in production and consumption 
away from the rail network, or to changes in parcel sizes. However, it is hypothesised 
that cross-subsidisation within rail contributed significantly to this phenomenon. In 
response to the government's economic development agenda for rural areas, the 
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practice was to use the returns from the more profitable transport of manufactured 
goods to subsidise low-value commodity transport, which resulted in a decline in 
manufacturing transport due to insufficient investment in manufacturing-transport 
requirements. 
Verburgh's data indicated the growth in road operational capacity compared with rail 
operational capacity, i.e. wagon and truck populations,3 but Verburgh did not comment on 
the fact that rail wagon volumes were growing more slowly than the commercial road 
vehicle population. In addition, rail's infrastructure that carries 180 million tons currently 
were already installed in 1956 and was, therefore, able to carry significantly more than the 
64 million tons that Verburgh reported for 1958. This implies that, in an “administered” 
tariff environment, at least some of the freight that shifted to road could have attracted 
lower tariffs on rail because of the high fixed cost component of rail infrastructure.  
 
Verburgh (1958, 36) reported on exemptions that were granted to road operators, allowing 
long-haul operations. The longer-term impact of long-haul road traffic in terms of road 
infrastructure investment and maintenance was not questioned. It also resulted in railway 
tariffs that remained unnaturally high owing to high fixed cost distributed over lower 
volumes, making the system more vulnerable than it should have been when deregulation 
finally occurred. Moreover, the high tariffs created a false sense of security in the narrow 
gauge, which has created undue investment challenges today.4  
The surface freight transport market share calculated from Verburgh's statistics is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
The dominance of rail in ton-kilometre terms is evident. The significant difference between 
rail's ton and ton-kilometre market share indicates that long-distance transport was on rail. 
If this is transposed to average transport distance, the figure for rail is 427 km, for road for 
reward 29 km and for road ancillary 17 km. Average transport distances are in balance with 
a “pipe and feeder” system, whereby railways are the pipe, fed over shorter distances by 
road transport for reward and very short distances by freight owners’ own ancillary 
transport systems. 
 
Yet Figure 2 shows that the downward trend in rail's transport of manufactured goods was 
already visible – although no mention of this is made in the research. The excess capacity on 
rail at that time, and the assumption that the expected growth in manufacturing production 
would be better served by road transport, negated the need for an understanding of 
balancing the transport modes. By not following through on a wider modal-balancing 
approach, Verburgh's study did not succeed in providing long-term infrastructure planning 
frameworks. At the same time, though, Verburgh's work was the first and last attempt in 
the history of macro-economic freight transport measurement in South Africa that 
attempted to develop a detailed strategic perspective. 
 
 
4.2 Smith's 1971 research 
The next study that attempted to quantify freight transport was conducted in 1971 by Smith 
(1973). Smith (1973, 1) cites difficulties at the Department of Statistics, a high percentage of 
transport-business mortalities and the “stringent limitations” of the effects of the 1930 Act, 
which regulated road freight transport, as the core issues that led to his study. Like 
Verburgh's work of 1958, Smith's was based on 329 returned questionnaires (Verburgh 
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based his on 403) from a sample of 4 000 out of the estimated 12 000 road hauliers, which 
resulted in a response rate of 8% (Verburgh's was 16%). 
 
Smith's study is silent on many of the ancillary, or freight-owner, transport statistics that 
Verburgh did report on, but it is possible to reconstruct some trends and data from his base 
data. Creating the same core statistics that were produced from Verburgh's data (a 
comparison that Smith – although referring to Verburgh extensively – interestingly did not 
do) enables an analysis of modal shifts in the intervening years. 
 
The data presented in Table 2 show that in the 14 years between the two surveys, tons 
transported more than doubled and ton-kilometres almost doubled. Rail market share in 
tons declined markedly, and in ton-kilometre terms both road for reward and ancillary road 
market share doubled, as illustrated in Table 3. 
 
The growth in average transport distances shown in Table 4 compared with the faster 
growth in tons transported versus ton-kilometres delivered is counter-intuitive. This is, 
however, a direct result of the changing structure of the market, whereby specialisation 
requires longer transport for the same level of output.  Economic performance in terms of 
gross domestic product per ton transported deteriorated, compared with 1957, but in terms 
of ton-kilometres delivered the performance improved, as shown in Table 5. 
 
The rising trend in economic performance per ton-kilometre as opposed to a declining trend 
in performance per ton is an interesting phenomenon, because even when the average 
transport distance for all modes increased, the average transport distance in the economy 
decreased from 141 km to 108 km. This is a feature of urbanisation, but could also be a lead 
indicator of specialisation, following urbanisation, in a multi-metropole economy that 
should predict corridor formation. 
 
Smith did not attempt the same level or depth of economic analysis as Verburgh and no 
further clarification of his interpretations are possible, as he did not elaborate on many of 
the salient issues that his research could have uncovered. A closer analysis of the data 
pointed to an increase in road activity compared with rail; especially as “rail-captured” 
traffic picked up and the increase in exemption applications by road transport operators and 
freight owners indicated that manufacturing transport was continuing its shift to road 
transport. 
 
4.3 Van der Veer's 1982 research 
 
In 1982 Van der Veer developed market share statistics for the period from 1971/72 to 
1980/81 (Jones 1999).5 The research yielded interesting performance figures for rail in this 
period, namely that tons transported increased by 50% and ton-kilometres by 63%. Rail's 
average transport distance increased, mainly owing to the commissioning of the export lines 
and an increase in cross-border traffic. What Jones (1999, 181) picked up, however, was that 
high-rated (i.e. manufacturing) traffic's contribution to tons transported by rail decreased 
from around 18% in the beginning of the 1970s to 12% at the end of that decade.  
 
Rail's revenue share of this traffic declined from around 50% to about 40% during the same 
period.   The question arises whether this is because of changes in the market structure or 
rail market share changes. For the only available time series of rail market share, Verburgh's 
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data are extended by using statistics obtained from Transnet Freight Rail to the end of the 
1970s, as depicted in Figure 6. 
The flattening of rail's manufacturing “market share” is visible in the 1970s, i.e. the 
correlation between rail's actual performance and market share by proxy seems to be in 
place. Rail's manufacturing market share, however, remained low. Jones (1999) discussed 
the rate problem as a potential cause of this, i.e. the railway's assumption that high-value 
rail cargo (mostly manufactured goods) was price-inelastic and higher rates charged for the 
high-value cargo could be used to cross-subsidise the transport of agricultural commodities. 
The assumption was not correct and shippers of manufactured commodities continued to 
seek alternative transport arrangements. 
4.4 Kennedy's 1984 research 
By the beginning of the 1980s, rail's cross-subsidisation approach was severely distorting the 
market. The advent of the age of logistics and total cost of ownership made this approach 
untenable. Yet the understanding of the changing market structure was still limited. 
Kennedy (1984, 19) quotes a road transport board official who maintained that “if a 
company needs road transport to stay in business, it is a marginal firm and probably should 
not be in business anyway”. 
 
This view ignores the value of road transport and concentrates on minimum transport costs 
to the detriment of other logistics functions, such as flexibility, reliability, goods security and 
road transport's capability of providing a door-to-door service. 
 
Kennedy (1984, 57) did a detailed analysis of road and rail costs in 1984. The purpose of his 
work was not to quantify freight volumes. However, it is included here not only to highlight 
some of the pertinent conclusions of his work, but also to point out the misconception that 
still existed regarding modal balance. 
 
Kennedy highlighted two of the reasons for road transport regulation, i.e. to protect the 
railway's traffic base (economic), and delay the deterioration of the road network 
(technical). He emphasised that the railways had not been balancing their books during 
preceding years (because of cross-subsidisation within rail and from other modes within the 
then South African Transport Services). According to Kennedy, therefore, the transport 
system was not working. He suggested that road levies charged at true usage costs would 
protect the road network (and by implication the rail network would be accountable for its 
true usage cost). 
 
Kennedy's work on costs was extensive, but he did not consider the impact of externalities. 
He also made a questionable comment on the resultant traffic loss of the railways (if full 
deregulation occurs and full costs are charged to both the railways and road). The comment 
refers to the loss of income of the railways and the consequent effect on the railways’ cost 
base: 
 
A very short time after such traffic losses, several days or weeks, there will be likely to be 
very little cost reduction, apart from reduced energy usage and damage inflicted upon the 
track structure. After several months, if the traffic reductions are significant on certain 
routes, the scheduling of trains, assignment of motive power and the organisation of yard 
and station forces can be adjusted to meet the new traffic levels (Kennedy 1984, 100). 
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Kennedy ignored the fact that most rail costs are fixed over the medium to long-term (they 
are sunk to some extent) and that all railways require high densities to be profitable. He 
does not consider intermodality (which by this time was an established technology 
internationally) and future freight levels, which could possibly change the income structure 
of a railway over dense long-haul corridors. 
 
4.5 Hamilton's 1985 research 
In 1985 Hamilton repeated Verburgh's methodology in response to a request from the 
South African Transport Services (which was then the operator of South Africa's railway) 
(Hamilton 1986, 1). Hamilton stated that the survey was needed to define the extent of the 
road haulage industry to enable infrastructure planning. His objectives were to determine 
origin-destination data by commodity and the modal structure of all surface freight in South 
Africa (excluding finally consumed product). Hamilton (1986, 3) mentioned in passing why 
some of the conclusions of the first survey he conducted in 1983 were suspect, namely: 
 that fleet sizes were used as a sampling unit rather than vehicle types, and that the 
number of operators per fleet size was difficult to establish; and 
 that vehicles with a gross mass of less than 5 tons are often registered as utility 
vehicles or in the name of private persons or other non-transport bodies, such as 
municipalities, statutory bodies or vehicle dealers – which would lead to under-
sampling and, therefore, undercounting. 
 
Hamilton's approach is once again to survey road-for-reward and ancillary operators with a 
questionnaire, which means that the basic supply-side approach did not change from 
Verburgh and Smith. He achieves a higher response rate of 13.5% (because of a shorter 
questionnaire and follow-up interviews), but this response rate represents only 113 
satisfactorily completed questionnaires (Hamilton 1986, 7). 
The modal performance data arising from Hamilton's survey are compared with Verburgh's 
and Smith's market shares in Table 6.  The modal market share can also be expressed in 
percentage terms (refer to Table 7).7  From the available data, average transport distances 
can also be calculated (see Table 8). These data show a significant (and concerning) increase 
in the average transport distances of road for reward, which was not commented on or 
explained by Hamilton.   
The results of the 1985 study seem to indicate a halt in the deterioration of the railways’ 
performance, apparently confirmed by an improvement in market share. However, if the 
approximately 40–50 million tons transported on the export lines at that stage (the export 
lines had begun functioning since the 1971 survey) are taken into account, as well as the 
natural growth in other mining commodities, this is not the case and rail market share 
remained flat at best.  
In fact, at this stage the Verburgh data sets of 1958 could be considered again and extended 
by using statistics obtained from Transnet Freight Rail up to 1985 to get a better picture of 
market share by proxy for the three transportable economic sectors (see Figure 7). These 
figures do point towards a flattening of the downward trend of rail performance since 1957 
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during the 1970s and early 1980s, and, therefore, seem to correspond well with Hamilton's 
data. 
A comparison of transport's economic performance over time is provided in Table 9.  The 
trend from 1957 to 1971 was reversed from 1971 to 1985. GDP per ton improved, but 
deteriorated per ton-kilometre. This is attributable to the building and commissioning of 
mass, low-value export systems, which are “ton-kilometre-hungry”. 
As with previous surveys, no strategic deductions or strategic infrastructure suggestions 
were made. He did request the co-operation of associations such as the Public Carriers 
Association and Association for Private Transport Owners, which was once again lacking 
during the research. In spite of this, Hamilton believed that the study would be repeated 
often (Hamilton 1986, 28). 
 
4.6 Pretorius’ research (1985–1990) 
In the late 1980s, the Research Unit for Transport Economic and Physical Distribution 
Studies of the then Rand Afrikaans University (now the University of Johannesburg) 
developed a database to fill the gap for “reliable information relating to the macro- as well 
as the micro-economic aspects of freight transport activities” (Pretorius 1991, 1). The report 
provided the first reference to macro-economic transport issues; it was extensive and 
provided some forecasts and developed indicators.  
The sample on which the surveys were based was initially extensive – close to 40 000 in 
1985 1986 and 1987 – but was reduced to below 10 000 in 1988 1989 and 1990 after more 
knowledge about the composition of the population was obtained. The stratified random 
sample considered population, gross geographical product and commercial-vehicle 
population. Unfortunately, two important transport performance parameters were missing, 
i.e. ton-kilometres and origin-destination pairs. The results for tons on a macro-level are 
shown in Table 10. 
The only known data for this time period were tons transported by rail, and Pretorius (1991, 
31) provided the sample's response and then compared this with actual tons transported by 
rail, but never discussed the dissimilarities between the two data sets (which were quite 
extensive). It seems that the deterioration in the sample size did not influence the reliability 
of the data very much because the performance of rail, as reported by the sample, 
undercounted its actual performance by 12% on average. (Pretorius did not provide this 
analysis.) The difference is illustrated in Table 11. 
The modal time series as extended by Pretorius’ work is provided in Table 12.  If Pretorius’ 
rail data are replaced with actual data, and if road transport data are ‘normalised’ with the 
12% undercounting observation for rail, the following picture emerges (see Table 13).  One 
could quote Pretorius’ data to say that on the eve of deregulation the economy required 
around 700 to 800 million tons of freight transport, with ancillary road accounting for about 
50% of the share, and road for reward and rail approximately 25% each. 
Pretorius’ surveys continued for a few years and were then discontinued. It is assumed that 
the lack of strategic context, lack of funding and lack of interest from the DoT contributed to 
the survey's demise.  
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A researcher at the University of Johannesburg, Bierman (2006, 12), repeated Pretorius’ 
work once in 2006 using the same methodology, and recent indications are that the 
University of Johannesburg aims to repeat the survey again. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The historical analysis of South Africa's freight transport infrastructure development and the 
endeavours to quantify freight transport flows analysed in this article point to fundamental 
principles that, if applied, could facilitate the integrated development of freight transport 
infrastructure in developing regions. The key enabler is a single national point of 
accountability for collaborative freight infrastructure development. The mandate of this 
entity starts with the development of a shared vision for the freight transport industry and 
investment and incentivisation against this vision. This is, however, only possible if 
appropriate market intelligence is developed, maintained and interpreted, and corrective 
action is taken when required. Such market intelligence includes: 
 
1. Tracking of modal balance: 
 
 Track trends in market share and interrogate noticeable shifts. 
 Within each mode, track and understand the differences between the different 
types of capacity per mode (installed, maintained and operational), as well as the 
utilisation of operational capacity. 
 Understand trade-off decisions between modes and the short term and long-term 
impact of such decisions. 
 If surveys need to be done, the cooperation of major transport agencies should be 
incentivised as this is critical to facilitate a sufficient number of responses. 
 
2. Forecasting and scenario development: 
 Understand the impact of structural changes in the economy on demand for 
transport – now and in future. 
 Understand the impact of structural changes in the global and domestic transport 
industry (such as a global move towards intermodality) and the impact on 
investment requirements. 
 Model the impact of government policies (e.g. cross-subsidisation) on long-term 
system sustainability. 
 
3. Developing and tracking key macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per ton-
kilometre and logistics costs as percentage of GDP to track the competitiveness of 
transport in serving the economy. 
 
Especially at the outset, the cost and time required to develop this information could be 
prohibitive. It is however still critical to use proxies for these analyses (such as cross-border 
data or shifts in GDP) so that the most informed investment decisions can be made. 
 
 
There are essentially three methodologies available for quantifying freight volumes: 
questionnaire-based surveys, truck movement observations and gravity modelling. The 
research discussed in this article is all based on surveys, and all the surveys had a very low 
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response rate. This is one of the key challenges with survey-based research, especially when 
there is no legal or other incentive to complete the questionnaire and is one of the core 
reasons why the majority of current research efforts (mentioned below) are based on truck 
movement observations and gravity modelling. 
 
The latest research efforts in South Africa are applying the above-mentioned lessons in an 
effort to inform long-term collaborative infrastructure planning. These research efforts 
started in the mid-1990s and culminated in the annual State of Logistics Survey, which has 
been published since 2004 (CSIR, University of Stellenbosch, and Imperial Logistics 2010) 
and the annual Transnet Freight Demand Model research (Havenga, Simpson, and Fourie 
2011), which started in 2005 and uses traffic counts and gravity modelling. The application 
of these lessons by other developing regions could fast-track the development of 
appropriate freight transport infrastructure and enable the circumvention of some of the 
challenges faced when a freight transport network is developed without this intelligence. 
 
The research in this article served a dual purpose in this regard. A historical view on freight 
modal market share and volumes in South Africa (given the quality concerns identified and 
analysed) contributes towards the understanding of long term trends. This is important 
given the long term nature of infrastructure spending that was argued. At the same time, 
deficiencies in measuring are identified in such a way that future researchers can improve 
volume and market share calculations to enable effective infrastructure spending. 
 
Notes 
2The cost function specifies an economically efficient use of resources, i.e. the firm chooses 
the least cost combination of inputs to produce a given output (as opposed to the 
production function which specifies a technically efficient use of labour and capital 
necessary to produce output, i.e. no resources are wasted) (Thompson n.d.). 
 
3The capacity of a transport system can be explained in terms of three classes, i.e. installed, 
maintained and operational. Installed capacity is the initial fixed investment, and can only 
be improved in leaps; maintained capacity is a view of the annual level of maintenance of 
this installed capacity, and can also only be improved in leaps if the maintenance schedule 
deteriorated; operational capacity is the real capacity available on the fixed infrastructure, 
given current levels of employees, systems, motive power and carrying capacity. 
 
4The carrying capacity of railway wagons – which remains the biggest driver of marginal 
costs and means that larger carrying capacities decrease costs – increases with a wider 
gauge. (In 1870, the unfortunate decision was made to narrow South Africa's gauge in order 
to permit the railway to cross the mountains north of Wellington more cost-effectively.) In 
most cases, this capacity can at least be doubled with a wider gauge. Compared with 
Europe, which has a wider gauge but half of South Africa's road truck carrying capacity 
limits, a significant marginal cost component of South Africa's rail system today has an 
installed backlog by a factor of four – a result of the absence of such reasoning by many 
researchers of the day. 
 
5Van der Veer's original research was not available. An analysis of his research conducted by 
Jones in 1999 is used as the basis for this discussion. The years used by Van der Veer 




6Hamilton conducted his first study in 1983. The study produced erratic results due to a very 
low response rate and is not discussed here. For an analysis of this study refer to Havenga 
2007, 94. 
 
7Rail ton-kilometre market share deteriorated despite the introduction of the ring-fenced 
bulk export lines. The reason for this was that the average transport distance of the coal line 
is 650 km and the iron ore line 850 km. Traffic being lost at that stage was mostly the 1500 







Table 1: Modal performance and market share in 1957*  
  Tons Ton-kilometres 








ancillary Total  
Millions 75 67 113 255  32 
000 
1 955 1 960 35 915  
% share 29 26 44 100  89 5 5 100  
*Calculated from Verburgh's distribution of vehicles per firm type (1958, 21), average 
distance loaded per annum (217) and ton-miles per vehicle (168). 
 
 
Table 2: Modal performance shifts between 1957 and 1971*  
  Million tons Million ton-kilometres 








ancillary Total  
Verburgh – 
1957 
75 67 113 255  32 
000 
1 955 1 960 35 915  
Smith – 1971 100 245 279 624  53 
000 
7 850 6 387 67 237  
CAGR**  2% 10% 7% 7%  4% 10% 9% 5%  
*Ancillary transport statistics calculated from average distance and tons per vehicle per 
annum, per industry group and vehicle fleet composition from growth rates in commercial 
vehicles, NAAMSA, and certificates issued (Smith, 1973: 5, 139–140, 144–145). 




Table 3: Modal market share shifts between 1957 and 1971  
  Tons (% market share) Tonkilometres (% market share) 











29 26 44 100 89 5 5 100 




Table 4: Average transport distance (ATD) shifts between 1957 and 1971  
  ATD (km) 
  Rail Road for reward Road ancillary 
Verburgh – 1957 427 29 17 
Smith – 1971 530 32 23 
 
 
Table 5: Economic performance related to transport input (constant 1995 prices)  
Year GDP per ton GDP per ton-km 
Verburgh – 1957 R659 R4,68 
Smith – 1971 R542 R5,03 
 
 
Table 6: Modal performance based on main surveys done up to 1985*  
  Million tons Million ton-kilometres 








ancillary Total  
Verburgh – 
1957 
75 67 113 255  32 
000 
1 955 1 960 35 915  
Smith – 1971 100 245 279 624  53 
000 
7 850 6 387 67 237  
Hamilton – 
1985 
170 263 241 674  91 
861 
31 297 14 219 137 
377  
* Hamilton split tons between road for reward and road ancillary, but not tonkilometres. 
Based on previous studies’ split between the ATD of these two categories, a rough 




Table 7: Modal market share shifts based on main surveys done up to 1985  
  Tons (% market share) Tonkilometres (% market share) 











29 26 44 100 89 5 5 100 
Smith – 1971 16 39 45 100 79 12 9 100 
Hamilton – 
1985 
25 39 36 100 67 23 10 100 
 
 
Table 8: Changes in average transport distance based on main surveys done up to 1985  
  ATD (km) 
  Rail Road for reward Road ancillary 
Verburgh – 1957 427 29 17 
Smith – 1971 530 32 23 
Hamilton – 1985 540 119 59 
 
 
Table 9: Economic performance related to transport input*  
Year GDP per ton GDP per ton-km ATD 
Verburgh – 1957 R659 R4,68 141 
Smith – 1971 R542 R5,03 108 
Hamilton – 1985 R717 R3,52 204 




Table 10: Pretorius's modal performance data 1985–1990 (Pretorius 1991: Appendix 2)  
  Million tons 
  Rail Road for reward Road ancillary Total 
1985  176 239 363 778 
1986  131 220 412 763 
1987  157 199 437 793 
1988  187 168 414 769 
1989  155 134 382 671 




Table 11: Undercounting of rail performance in Pretorius's sample*  
  
Rail – Pretorius (million 
tons) 






1985  176 182 6 3 
1986  131 178 47 26 
1987  157 188 31 16 
1988  187 187 0 0 
1989  155 179 24 13 
1990  164 184 20 11 




Table 12: Modal performance 1957–1990 based on all available sources  
  Million tons 
  Rail Road for reward Road ancillary Total 
Verburgh – 1957  75 67 113 255 
Smith – 1971  100 245 279 624 
Hamilton – 1985  170 263 241 674 
Pretorius – 1985  176 239 363 778 
Pretorius – 1986  131 220 412 763 
Pretorius – 1987  157 199 437 793 
Pretorius – 1988  187 168 414 769 
Pretorius – 1989  155 134 382 671 
Pretorius – 1990  164 131 353 648 
 
 
Table 13: Modal performance: Pretorius’ data normalised  
  Million tons 
  Rail - actual Road for reward Road ancillary Total 
Verburgh – 1957 75 67 113 255 
Smith – 1971 100 245 279 624 
Hamilton – 1985 170 263 241 674 
Pretorius – 1985 182 272 414 868 
Pretorius – 1986 178 251 470 899 
Pretorius – 1987 188 227 498 913 
Pretorius – 1988 187 192 472 851 
Pretorius – 1989 179 153 435 767 






Figure 1:  Historical development of South Africa's road and rail transport infrastructure  




Figure 2:  GDP dollars per ton-kilometre – global comparison*  
*For ton-kilometre data the main sources were OECD (2010) and Eurostat (2009). For countries not 
available in these sources, the following sources were used:  
Trading Economics (2010): 
 
 
Figure 3:  Global logistics costs as percentage of GDP comparisons 
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Figure 6:  Rail tons transported as a percentage of transportable GDP  
Sources: Rail tons up to 1956 from Verburgh (1958), rail tons from 1957 onwards from Transnet 
Freight Rail (2011). 
 
 
Figure 7:  Extrapolation of Verburgh's original 1958 data sets  
Sources: Rail tons up to 1956 from Verburgh (1958), rail tons from 1957 onwards from 
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